Poopsex Essays - Platonism, Analogy, Socratic Dialogues,

Poopsex The Divided Line (The Republic , Book VI) Socrates You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the name. May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind? Glaucon I have. Socrates Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand? Glaucon Yes, I understand. Socrates Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made. Glaucon Very good. Socrates Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge? 1 Glaucon Most undoubtedly. Socrates Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided. Glaucon In what manner? Socrates Thus: There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by thw former division as images; the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves. 2 Glaucon I do not quite understand your meaning. Socrates Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are [emailprotected] of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and teh figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusions? Glaucon Yes, I know. Socrates And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideas which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and teh absolute diameter, and so on, the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadowsa and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind? Glaucon That is true. Socrates And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resembalcnes in their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value. Glaucon I understand that you are speaking of the province of geometry and the sister arts. Socrates And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but openly as hypotheses, that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses,